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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Presently pending before the en banc court in this 
trademark infringement action is the appeal (No. 97-1541) 
of Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. ("VS Stores") and Victoria's 
Secret Catalogue, Inc. ("VS Catalogue") (together "VS"), a 
well-known manufacturer of lingerie and now swimwear, 
from the order of the District Court that found VS had 
violated the Lanham Act. This trademark infringement 
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action had been filed by appellee A&H Sportswear ("A&H") 
and its affiliate, Mainstream Swimsuit, Inc., (together 
"A&H") challenging VS's use of the trademark THE 
MIRACLE BRA on lingerie and swimwear. The District 
Court found that VS did not infringe A&H's trademark by 
its use of THE MIRACLE BRA on lingerie. However, the 
District Court did find infringement by VS on the ground 
that its use of THE MIRACLE BRA on swimwear created a 
"possibility of confusion" with A&H's MIRACLESUIT 
swimsuit. It thus ordered VS to publish a disclaimer when 
marketing THE MIRACLE BRA swimwear and to pay past 
and future royalty fees to A&H. 
 
VS contends in No. 97-1541 that the District Court's use 
of a "possibility of confusion" standard rather than the 
prevalent "likelihood of confusion" standard was error and 
that the royalty award was an abuse of discretion. For its 
part, A&H contends that because the District Court found 
a possibility of confusion between the MIRACLE BRA 
swimwear and the MIRACLESUIT, it was entitled to an 
accounting of the profits VS made. A&H filed a cross-appeal 
(No. 97-1570) in which it contends that the District Court 
clearly erred in failing to find a likelihood of confusion 
between THE MIRACLE BRA mark as applied to lingerie 
and A&H's prior MIRACLESUIT mark. 
 
A panel of this court heard argument on the appeal and 
cross-appeal on May 19, 1998. Thereafter, the panel 
recommended a court originated rehearing en banc, see 
Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 9.4, so that the 
en banc court could decide whether to approve the 
possibility of confusion standard for trademark 
infringement applied by the District Court. 
 
After the court solicited the views of counsel for the 
parties regarding en banc consideration, the court voted to 
take this case en banc, and the Chief Judge so ordered on 
August 26, 1998. The parties were given the opportunity to 
file supplementary briefs. Based on the court's review of the 
original and supplementary briefs, the court en banc voted 
to consider VS's appeal (No. 97-1541) on the basis of the 
briefs submitted by the parties, which forcefully and 
comprehensively set forth their positions and the relevant 
law. 
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The court further determined that the cross-appeal (No. 
97-1570) does not present any issue that requires en banc 
consideration, and resubmitted that appeal to the original 
panel. We recognize that this treatment will entail some 
duplication between the panel and en banc opinions. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The underlying facts are set forth in the District Court's 
two lengthy published opinions, A&H Sportswear Co. v. 
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (addressing liability), and A&H Sportswear Co. v. 
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Pa. 
1997) (as amended) (addressing remedies). The District 
Court's Findings of Fact from the opinion on liability are 
designated hereafter as FF. 
 
A&H, a closely held Pennsylvania corporation and maker 
of 10% of the nation's swimsuits, was issued a trademark 
for its MIRACLESUIT on October 27, 1992; its affiliate, 
Mainstream Swimsuits, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, 
served as the exclusive distributor of the MIRACLESUIT 
through its SWIM SHAPER division. Both corporations are 
controlled by members of the Waldman family. FF 1-2. 
 
The MIRACLESUIT was developed and subsequently 
marketed as a "control" suit whose patented fabric and 
design afford the wearer greater "hold-in" control of the 
hips and waist, making the wearer appear slimmer without 
the use of girdle-like undergarments. Most MIRACLESUITs 
contain underwire bras, are of a one-piece design, and 
retail for $54 to over $100. FF 14. The first interstate use 
of the mark MIRACLESUIT and the first interstate sale of a 
MIRACLESUIT occurred in November 1991. FF 21. The 
name MIRACLESUIT was chosen because it was "unique, 
dynamic, exciting and memorable." FF 22. In 1992, the 
MIRACLESUIT was widely advertised, shown, and 
discussed in trade shows, magazines and the electronic 
media. FF 27. The MIRACLESUIT was also sold for a brief 
time in the VS catalogue (1,700 suits were purchased by VS 
in 1992 and 1993), but the arrangement was discontinued 
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because VS failed to identify the MIRACLESUIT by its 
trademark in several instances. FF 29, 30. 
 
VS Stores is the nation's top retailer of lingerie. It is a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, 
and operates over 650 stores throughout the country which 
focus on intimate apparel, with bra sales the leading 
product. FF 5. VS Catalogue, a Delaware corporation 
headquartered in New York City, is a mail order business 
selling a much wider array of merchandise (including 
swimwear) through over 300 million catalogues it circulates 
each year. FF 6. VS Stores and VS Catalogue are 
independent subsidiaries of Intimate Brands, Inc., owned 
by The Limited, Inc., based primarily in London. FF 7. 
 
In 1992, VS Stores began developing a cleavage- 
enhancing bra, which was introduced (then unnamed) in 
each store in August 1993 and first appeared in the VS 
catalogue in February 1994. FF 12, 17, 19. The bra uses 
removable pads, lace, straps, and underwire to accentuate 
the wearer's bust. FF 15. VS Stores sought a name for its 
new push-up bra that had a "fresh, flirtatious fun attitude" 
and chose THE MIRACLE BRA name in December 1992, 
allegedly after a model, who tried the new bra, exclaimed 
"Wow, this is a miracle!" FF 23. 
 
The name THE MIRACLE BRA was first used in VS stores 
in November 1993. FF 19. VS Stores was issued a 
registration for its trademark THE MIRACLE BRA on 
August 9, 1994. FF 25. Since its first brisk sales, THE 
MIRACLE BRA, which retails for under $20, has been 
heavily marketed and has generated over $132 million in 
sales. FF 69. A&H did not initially object to VS's trademark 
use of THE MIRACLE BRA on lingerie. 
 
The following year, VS began to extend THE MIRACLE 
BRA into swimwear with its introduction of THE MIRACLE 
BRA bikini in the November 1994 VS catalogue and in ten 
VS stores as a test market. Sales expanded to 160 stores in 
the Spring of 1995, and, at that time, THE MIRACLE BRA 
design and trademark was incorporated into a one-piece 
swimsuit, using the push-up features of THE MIRACLE 
BRA. VS retailed the swimsuit for approximately $69, about 
the same price as many MIRACLESUITs. FF 31-34, 15, 8, 
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44. Previously, VS Stores had offered swimsuits only three 
or four times over eight years, but VS Catalogue had begun 
to build its swimsuit business by launching a swimwear 
specialty catalogue in March 1994, which contained 
swimsuits of other manufacturers. FF 5, 32. 
 
In August 1994, even before its first sale of THE 
MIRACLE BRA swimsuit, VS Stores applied for a 
registration of THE MIRACLE BRA trademark for swimwear. 
FF 34. Apparently because it had been using THE 
MIRACLE BRA name in lingerie, neither VS Stores nor VS 
Catalogue conducted a separate trademark search of THE 
MIRACLE BRA trademark as it applied to swimwear. FF 35. 
In February 1995, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
refused the registration on the basis of A&H's prior 
registration of the MIRACLESUIT, although A&H had not 
interposed an objection to the registration. FF 31, 36. 
 
In December 1994, just a month after the introduction of 
THE MIRACLE BRA swimwear collection, A&H filed this 
suit alleging, inter alia, infringement of its trademark 
MIRACLESUIT, and seeking a preliminary injunction and 
damages. The District Court consolidated the injunction 
hearing with a bench trial on the merits. Following a two- 
week bench trial, the District Court found no likelihood of 
confusion between THE MIRACLE BRA mark as applied to 
lingerie and the MIRACLESUIT mark. That judgment is the 
subject of A&H's cross-appeal, addressed in the opinion of 
the panel referred to above. 
 
With respect to the marks as applied to swimwear, the 
District Court's opinion on liability has no explicit finding 
that there was no likelihood of confusion between THE 
MIRACLE BRA and the MIRACLESUIT marks. There are 
statements in the subsequent opinion on damages which 
could suggest such a finding, but that opinion contains no 
explicit analysis of the likelihood of confusion between the 
two trademarks as applied to swimwear. 
 
The District Court did find, in its opinion on liability, that 
there was a possibility of confusion between the two marks 
as applied to swimwear. The District Court believed that 
under the applicable law "where a party moved into the 
territory of an established concern, the likelihood of 
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confusion standard' should be lowered to a `possibility of 
confusion.' " 926 F. Supp. at 1265 (citation omitted). 
Because the court treated VS as a "newcomer" which used 
a mark similar to that of an "established concern," it 
concluded that VS's use of the MIRACLE BRA on swimwear 
had infringed the MIRACLESUIT mark. After the District 
Court issued its liability ruling, it certified its order under 
28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) as raising the issue of the proper legal 
standard to be applied to trademark infringement, and VS 
sought permission to appeal to this court. We declined to 
accept the interlocutory appeal. 
 
The District Court then conducted a two-day trial on 
damages. Because no court had ever found a party in 
violation of the lower possibility of confusion standard (a 
standard unique to this Circuit), the District Court was 
without any precedent as to a remedy and decided to 
borrow an equitable remedy from patent law. It awarded 
A&H royalties on past and future net sales of THE 
MIRACLE BRA swimwear, quantified past damages 
($63,480 against VS Stores and $1,086,640 against VS 
Catalogue) and ordered VS to continue to use the following 
disclaimer: "The Miracle Bra(R) swimwear collection is 
exclusive to Victoria's Secret and not associated with 
MIRACLESUIT(R) by SWIM SHAPER(R)". This disclaimer 
continues to appear wherever VS markets its THE 
MIRACLE BRA swimwear. VS had begun voluntarily using 
the disclaimer following the liability verdict. 
 
The District Court denied all of A&H's other claims and 
requested relief, including relief under the theories of 
reverse confusion and unjust enrichment, and denied 
A&H's request for an accounting, punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees. VS moved for an initial en banc review, 
focusing on the District Court's adoption of the possibility 
of confusion standard, but the motion was denied and the 
appeal was originally heard by the panel. The District Court 
entered an order staying its order of relief pending appeal. 
As set forth above, VS's appeal (No. 97-1541) is now before 
this court en banc. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
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II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
MIRACLESUIT v. THE MIRACLE BRA for Swimwear 
 
In a trademark infringement action, the "likelihood of 
confusion" between two marks is a factual matter, subject 
to review for clear error. Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 
F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995). However, the legal standard 
to be applied is a matter of law and, like all conclusions of 
law, is subject to plenary review. See Duraco Prods., Inc. v. 
Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
To succeed in a claim for trademark infringement under 
section 32 of the Lanham Act, the owner of a valid and 
legally protectable mark, such as A&H, must show that the 
defendant has used a confusingly similar mark. Section 
32(1) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who shall, without the consent of the 
       registrant-- 
 
       (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, 
       copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
       connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
       distribution, or advertising of any goods or services 
       on or in connection with which such use is likely to 
       cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; 
       . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant 
       . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1114(1) (emphasis added). 
 
The same standard is embodied in section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, which governs unfair competition claims. That 
section provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
       services, . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
       symbol, or device . . . or any false designation of origin 
       . . . which-- 
 
       (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 
       or to deceive as to . . . the origin, sponsorship, or 
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       approval of [his or her] goods, services, or 
       commercial activities by another person . . . shall be 
       liable in a civil action by any person who believes 
       that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such 
       act. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
More than a century ago, and even before the enactment 
of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
need to avoid consumer confusion as the central concern 
motivating trademark law when it stated, "All that courts of 
justice can do . . . is to say that no trader can adopt a 
trademark, so resembling that of another trader, as that 
ordinary purchasers, buying with ordinary caution, are 
likely to be misled." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 
(1878); see also Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 
852, 862-63 (3d Cir. 1992); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor 
Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293 (3d Cir. 1991); 3 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
S 23:1, at 23-6 to -8 (4th ed. 1996). The confusion that 
trademark law seeks to prevent is confusion as to the 
source of the goods. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 
Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978); McCarthy, supra 
S 23:5, at 23-14. 
 
As the law has developed, the standard to be applied 
when goods that are the subject of a trademark 
infringement claim are directly competing, as is the 
situation with THE MIRACLE BRA for swimwear and 
MIRACLESUIT, a swimwear product, is different than that 
applied when the goods are not competing. The ten-factor 
test for likelihood of confusion between marks that are not 
competing, derived from Scott Paper Co, 589 F.2d at 1229, 
is not required when the goods directly compete. In fact, we 
have said that "[w]here the trademark owner and the 
alleged infringer deal in competing goods or services, the 
court need rarely look beyond the mark itself." Interpace 
Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
In this case, the District Court did not make an explicit 
finding as to whether there was a likelihood of confusion 
between THE MIRACLE BRA when applied to swimwear and 
MIRACLESUIT, a swimwear product.1 Instead, because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In its opinion on damages, the District Court stated that it had 
concluded in the liability opinion that "Plaintiffs had not met their 
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court concluded that VS was a newcomer to the swimwear 
industry, it determined that a lower standard governed 
infringement and, based on its interpretation of our 
caselaw, it applied only a possibility of confusion rather 
than a likelihood of confusion test.2 The District Court 
concluded that there was a possibility of confusion between 
the two marks and hence found infringement. 
 
Our decision to take this appeal en banc presents us 
with the opportunity to clarify whether we previously 
adopted the possibility of confusion test and, if so, whether 
we should continue to adhere to it. With this in mind, we 
examine our prior decisions dealing with this issue on 
which the District Court relied. 
 
In Country Floors, Inc. v. Partnership of Gepner and Ford, 
930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1991), we considered the claim of 
Country Floors, a manufacturer and seller of upscale 
ceramic tiles and accessories, that a competitor's use and 
advertising of "Country Tiles" constituted infringement and 
unfair competition. The District Court had granted 
summary judgment in favor of the alleged infringer, but we 
reversed because the District Court erred in making 
credibility findings on summary judgment and because "a 
number of key factual questions remained, not least among 
them the likelihood of confusion" between the newcomer's 
"Country Tiles" logo and the "Country Floors" trademark. 
Id. at 1058, 1064. 
 
In discussing our holding, we adhered to the prevalent 
"likelihood of confusion" standard. For example, in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
burden of establishing a likelihood of confusion under the applicable 
legal doctrines summarized in Scott Paper . . . and its progeny." 967 F. 
Supp. at 1461. The reference in the liability opinion is to a conclusion 
of law that followed a lengthy and detailed analysis of the facts and law. 
To the extent that the earlier analysis applied the likelihood of 
confusion 
standard, it did so only in the lingerie vs. swimwear context, not in 
comparing swimwear to swimwear. 
 
2. The court noted that in a telephone conversation six months after the 
conclusion of the trial, the parties agreed the court should consider this 
doctrine, and A&H's complaint was deemed amended to include this as 
an alternate theory for relief. See 926 F. Supp. at 1266. 
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context of finding that there was evidence from which a 
factfinder could find actual confusion, we noted that 
"[a]lthough only likelihood of confusion, and not actual 
confusion, is required by the Lanham Act, actual confusion 
usually implies a likelihood of confusion." Id. at 1064. We 
then stated that because the case contained other issues 
involving "law peculiar to trademark, tradename and unfair 
competition cases," we would "comment on them for the 
guidance of the District Court." Id. at 1065. It was in this 
latter context that the discussion of the possibility of 
confusion standard arose. We stated: 
 
       [Plaintiff Country Floors] says the Partnership moved 
       into the territory of an established concern and that 
       the "likelihood of confusion standard" should be 
       lowered to a "possibility of confusion," the standard 
       applied when a newcomer enters an area already 
       occupied by an established business. See Telechron, 
       Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 908-09 (3d Cir. 
       1952). We agree. This legal conclusion requires the 
       district court to determine what market is relevant to 
       the Corporation's claim that use of the name "Country 
       Tiles" violates S 43(a) of the [Lanham] Act. Thus, if the 
       possibility exists that the names "Country Floors" and 
       "Country Tiles" will be confused, determination of the 
       relevant market becomes especially important on the 
       Corporation's claim that the Partnership has 
       appropriated the Corporation's tradename in violation 
       of S 43(a) of the Lanham Act by adopting a confusingly 
       similar tradename. 
 
Id. at 1065 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 
The 1952 Telechron decision, cited in the above passage, 
appears to have been the genesis of the "possibility of 
confusion" test in this circuit. In that case, we, upheld an 
injunction that was granted to the holder of the Telechron 
mark, used for clocks and small radio sets, against use of 
"Telicon" in the television and large radiofield. Telechron, 
Inc., 198 F.2d at 908. We first noted and emphasized the 
similarity of the coined words. We also approved the 
approach of Judge Learned Hand that "as between two 
arbitrary trade names `any possible doubt of the likelihood 
of damage should be resolved in favor of the (first user).' " 
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Id. at 909 (quoting Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. 
Corp., 219 F. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1915)). The Telechron case 
did not, however, deviate from the statutory likelihood of 
confusion standard, and thus is questionable precedent for 
the reference to a new possibility of confusion standard in 
Country Floors. 
 
Country Floors was cited the following year in Merchant & 
Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Building Products Co., 963 F.2d 628 
(3d Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), a case in 
which the District Court had granted a preliminary 
injunction providing relief for infringement of the trade 
dress of Zip-Rib, a concealed fastener metal roofing system, 
by a copied product. We held the trade dress feature 
functional, but discussed the test for confusion in the 
context of the claim of infringement of the logo. We 
remanded so that the district court could apply the 
appropriate factors in determining whether there was a 
likelihood of confusion. We then stated, in reference to 
Country Floors, 
 
       we do not preclude the district court from finding on 
       remand that Merchant has satisfied its burden of 
       showing that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction 
       on its trademark infringement claim. As this court held 
       in Country Floors, when a newcomer moves into a 
       territory of an established concern and uses a name or 
       mark similar in some respect to that used by the 
       established concern, "the `likelihood of confusion 
       standard' should be lowered to a `possibility of 
       confusion' " standard. We believe the appropriate 
       course in light of the district court's failure to give 
       sufficient consideration to a number of relevant factors 
       in its analysis is to remand so that the court can 
       consider those factors in its determination of whether 
       Merchant has shown a possibility of confusion between 
       the marks. 
 
Id. at 637-38 (citation omitted). 
 
One respected commentator has characterized our 
discussion of possibility of confusion in Country Floors as 
dictum. See McCarthy, supra S 23:3, at 23-12. Indeed, that 
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discussion was neither used in nor essential to the holding. 
It is more difficult to characterize as dictum the language 
from Merchant & Evans quoted above, as that was part of 
the direction to be followed by the District Court on 
remand. Moreover, we did not treat the references to 
possibility of confusion as dictum in our subsequent 
decision in Versa Prods. Co., 50 F.3d at 200. 
 
The issue in Versa was alleged infringement of a trade 
dress used in control panels of offshore oil-drilling rigs. 
Both trade dress and trademark infringement are governed 
by the same statutory provision, section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, which requires a plaintiff to prove there was 
a likelihood of confusion. See Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 
769-70. In his opinion, Judge, now Chief Judge, Becker 
recognized that the usual formulation requires a showing of 
a likelihood or probability of confusion but stated that, 
"[w]here an alleged infringer was new to an area and the 
plaintiff was well-established, this court has at times 
replaced the `likelihood of confusion' requirement with a 
lower `possibility of confusion' standard." Versa Prods. Co., 
50 F.3d at 200 (citing Telechron, Inc., 198 F.2d at 908-09; 
Country Floors, Inc., 930 F.2d at 1065; and Merchant & 
Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d at 637-38). In Versa, we commented 
that "a Johnny-come-lately copier arguably creates a 
greater risk" that consumers will be misled as to source, 
but we nonetheless rejected the "possibility of confusion" 
standard in trade dress cases, except, at most, as "a factor 
properly taken into account in assessing the likelihood of 
confusion." Versa, 50 F.3d at 201. 
 
After distinguishing trade dress from trademark we said, 
as to the latter: 
 
       The trademark "possibility of confusion" standard must 
       therefore be supported by other considerations. We 
       believe that the primary reasons for lowering the 
       measure of confusion when a newcomer copies an 
       established trademark are the general lack of legitimate 
       reasons for copying a competitor's mark, and the high 
       degree of reliance by consumers on trademarks as 
       indicators of the source of products. Whether or not 
       these considerations translate to the realm of product 
       packaging, we think that with respect to product 
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       configurations the significance of each of the factors is 
       greatly diminished. . . . Indeed, if any modification of 
       the likelihood of confusion standard is justified in the 
       product configuration context, the standard might well 
       be heightened, perhaps to a "high probability of 
       confusion." Nevertheless, we see no need to adopt such 
       a standard today, preferring for now merely to reject 
       the "possibility of confusion" standard for product 
       configuration infringement cases, and adhering to the 
       conventional "likelihood of confusion" standard. 
 
Id. But see Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 773 ("There is no 
persuasive reason to apply different analysis as to 
[trademarks and trade dress]"). 
 
In light of the language in our opinions, the District 
Court was not unreasonable to interpret our line of cases 
as establishing that the lower possibility of confusion 
standard is to be applied when a newcomer enters the 
swimwear business. Although the District Court expressly 
rejected characterizing its theory as a "newcomer" doctrine, 
at least as that theory was applied by the Second Circuit in 
Thompson Med. Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 214 (2d 
Cir. 1985),3 it is apparent that the court's analysis in fact 
is premised upon a "newcomer" theory. Because the court 
characterized VS as a "newcomer" to the swimwear 
business, it held that VS infringed A&H's MIRACLESUIT 
based on the possibility of confusion standard.4 
 
VS contends that there is no possibility of confusion 
standard under the Lanham Act, and that if this court in 
fact has created such a lower standard, we should reverse 
course. A&H has consistently argued that the District Court 
should have begun its analysis with (and found) a 
likelihood of confusion between THE MIRACLE BRA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court noted that the Second Circuit doctrine requires that 
a senior user's mark be highly distinctive and that the junior user be 
guilty of bad faith, elements that the Third Circuit has not adopted. 926 
F. Supp. at 1265 n.11. 
 
4. VS argues it was erroneously characterized as a newcomer, and that 
its entry into the swimwear market preceded its use of THE MIRACLE 
BRA in swimsuits. As we will remand, we will not preclude the District 
Court from considering that argument. 
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swimwear and the MIRACLESUIT, which would have made 
resort to the possibility of confusion standard unnecessary. 
In its reply brief, A&H nevertheless took the position that 
the possibility of confusion standard also is a proper basis 
for a finding of liability and for granting the relief it seeks. 
In its supplemental brief to the en banc court, however, 
A&H recognizes that such a test would "requir[e] nothing 
more than airy speculation." A&H Suppl. Br. at 1. 
 
We are concerned that our inexactitude of language may 
have engendered confusion as to the appropriate standard. 
For example, this court used the likelihood of confusion 
standard in Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 
F.3d 466, 472 (3d Cir. 1994), an opinion decided after 
Country Floors and Merchant & Evans and authored by the 
same judge who authored Merchant & Evans. Moreover, the 
district courts in this circuit have not been uniform in their 
application of our precedent. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. 
Co. of Am. v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co., 943 F. 
Supp. 509, 521 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (acknowledging but not 
applying possibility of confusion standard); Genovese Drug 
Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 344-45 
(D.N.J. 1996) (same); Barre-Nat'l, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 
773 F. Supp. 735, 740-41 (D.N.J. 1991) (same); Blumenfeld 
Dev. Corp. v. Carnival Cruise Lines Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1297, 
1319-20 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting possibility of confusion 
standard but finding likelihood of confusion). 
 
We take this opportunity to hold that the appropriate 
standard for determining trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act is the likelihood of confusion. 
 
In the first place, "likelihood of confusion" is the language 
used in the Lanham Act. In the second place, the 
impressive survey set forth in VS's original brief, and 
supplemented in its supplemental brief, demonstrates that 
the other circuits are unanimous in requiring the use of the 
likelihood of confusion standard in Lanham Act 
infringement cases. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. 
Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Likelihood of 
confusion . . . is more than a mere possibility of 
confusion."); International Ass'n of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 
196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996) (markholder "must show more 
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than the theoretical possibility of confusion"); August Storck 
K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(possibility of confusion not sufficient; if it were, "all 
comparative references would be forbidden, and consumers 
as a whole would be worse off"); Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott 
Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[A] mere 
possibility is not enough; there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the public will be confused.' "); see also 
cases collected in the Appendix. 
 
The cases originally cited by A&H as reflecting 
acceptance by some courts of the possibility of confusion 
standard merely use the word "possible" or "possibility" in 
discussion but do not establish a lower standard for finding 
liability in trademark infringement. For example, in G.D. 
Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 
1959), the court, after quoting its earlier statement that 
"[o]ne entering a field of endeavor already occupied by 
another should, in the selection of a trade-name or trade- 
mark, keep far enough away to avoid all possible 
confusion," id. at 387 (citation omitted) nevertheless plainly 
stated that "the test under the statute . . . is likelihood of 
confusion" and applied that test in reversing the District 
Court's finding for the defendant, id. 
 
Similarly, in Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, 
Inc., 281 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1960), although the court 
stated, "Important in determining whether the second 
comer's entrance into the market creates possible 
confusion, is any evidence of conscious imitation of the first 
comer's product," id. at 758, both the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals applied the likelihood of confusion 
standard, see id. at 757-58. 
 
Nor does this court's recent decision in Pappan Enters., 
Inc. v. Hardee's Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800 (3d Cir. 1998), 
also cited by A&H, employ a possibility of confusion 
standard. That was an appeal from the denial of a 
preliminary injunction. It is true that in the discussion of 
the irreparable injury factor, a requisite for a preliminary 
injunction, we stated that irreparable injury could be based 
on a possibility of confusion, id. at 805, but there we were 
not addressing the standard for trademark infringement. 
Pappan neither applied nor endorsed a possibility of 
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confusion standard, as is clear in the next sentence in the 
opinion which states, in discussing injunctive relief, "This 
court has held that once the likelihood of confusion caused 
by trademark infringement has been established, the 
inescapable conclusion is that there was also irreparable 
injury." Id. 
 
A leading treatise on trademark law is instructive: 
 
       Likelihood of confusion has been said to be 
       synonymous with "probable" confusion - it is not 
       sufficient if confusion is merely possible. . . . Dicta in a 
       few cases hint at a "possibility of confusion" test. . . . 
       The Third Circuit . . . would apply the theory[of a 
       possibility of confusion standard] to a newcomer 
       entering a territory already occupied by an established 
       business. The Third Circuit has said that the primary 
       reasons for its lower measure of confusion are "the 
       general lack of legitimate reasons for copying a 
       competitor's mark . . . and the high degree of reliance 
       by consumers on trademarks as indicators of the 
       source of their products." [Versa Prods. Co., 50 F.3d at 
       201.] Author's Comment: The Third Circuit's 
       explanation for its possibility theory does not 
       satisfactorily explain the need for a different standard. 
       Such a rule tilts the competitive playing field in favor 
       of the established company and against the competitive 
       newcomer. 
 
McCarthy, supra S 23:3, at 23-11 to -12 (emphasis in 
original) (footnotes omitted); see also David Perry, 
"Possibility of Confusion" in Third Circuit Trademark 
Infringement: A Standard Without a Test, 71 Temple L. Rev. 
101 (1998). 
 
We hold that the District Court erred in holding VS liable 
under a possibility of confusion standard. Therefore, we will 
remand this case to the District Court so that it can 
conduct the appropriate analysis of the likelihood of 
confusion under the standards set by the Lanham Act and 
in the relevant precedent. As one commentator explains: 
"Whether confusion is likely is proved by inference drawn 
from the totality of relevant facts identified and analyzed by 
established rules . . . . `There are no hard and fast rules as 
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to how much evidence of confusion is enough. Rather, 
when looking at the evidence the reviewing court must take 
into consideration the circumstances surrounding each 
particular case.' " Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of 
Confusion in Trademark Law, S 1.8 (PLI, 1997) (quoting 
Dieter v. B&H Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 
1989)). 
 
Because the District Court did not proceed to that step in 
its analysis, it did not address whether the interaction 
between THE MIRACLE BRA and the MIRACLESUIT 
implicates the doctrine of reverse confusion, expressly 
adopted by this court in Fisons, 30 F.3d at 474. There we 
explained, "Reverse confusion occurs when a larger more 
powerful company uses the trademark of a smaller, less 
powerful senior owner and thereby causes likely confusion 
as to the source of the senior user's goods or services." Id. 
The result of reverse confusion, which is similar to dilution, 
"is that the senior user loses the value of the trademark - 
its product identity, corporate identity, control over its 
goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new 
markets." Id. at 474-75 (quoting Ameritech, Inc. v. American 
Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 
1987)). 
 
In support of its claim of reverse confusion, A&H 
produced evidence that VS's expenditures for advertising 
and promotion far surpassed its own, although the parties 
joust over the actual figures. VS argues that the reverse 
confusion doctrine is inapplicable because A&H also 
conducted significant advertising. It points to the $1.2 
million A&H spent on direct advertising of MIRACLESUIT 
and to the extensive free publicity the MIRACLESUIT 
received. VS concedes that it spent more money on 
advertising, but insists that A&H was not overwhelmed. 
 
The District Court discussed the advertising campaigns, 
see 926 F. Supp. at 1250, but did not make an explicit 
finding regarding reverse confusion. The only purpose of 
the reverse confusion analysis is to ascertain if consumers 
are confused as to the source because of the massive influx 
of advertising and promotional material. Although the 
District Court's finding that there was no likelihood of 
confusion as between MIRACLESUIT and THE MIRACLE 
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BRA lingerie necessarily means that it found no reverse 
confusion in that market, we can draw no conclusion as to 
what the court found as to reverse confusion in the 
swimwear to swimwear market. On remand, that will be 
among the issues to be considered by the court in 
determining whether A&H has shown a likelihood of 
confusion. 
 
III. 
 
REMEDY 
 
Inasmuch as we will vacate the judgment for A&H 
because it was based on the finding of possibility of 
confusion, it necessarily follows that the remedy ordered 
will be vacated as well. We nonetheless offer some guidance 
on the issue of remedies, should the court find 
infringement under the likelihood of confusion standard. 
 
The Lanham Act provides for two remedies following a 
finding of liability for infringement. The most generally 
applied remedy is injunctive relief pursuant to section 34, 
which provides that "courts vested with jurisdiction of civil 
actions arising under this chapter shall have power to grant 
injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon 
such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent 
the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office." 15 U.S.C. 
S 1116(a). 
 
The other statutory remedy, monetary damages 
(including costs), is provided by section 35, which states in 
pertinent part: 
 
       (a) When a violation of any right of the registrant of a 
       mark . . . shall have been established . . . the plaintiff 
       shall be entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, 
       to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages 
       sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the 
       action. The court shall assess such profits and 
       damages or cause the same to be assessed under its 
       direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be 
       required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant 
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       must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. 
       In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, 
       according to the circumstances of the case, for any 
       sum above the amount found as actual damages, not 
       exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall 
       find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is 
       either inadequate or excessive the court may in its 
       discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court 
       shall find to be just . . . . Such sum in either of the 
       above circumstances shall constitute compensation 
       and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may 
       award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1117(a). 
 
The District Court declined to enter the broad injunction 
sought by A&H prohibiting VS from use of THE MIRACLE 
BRA mark with swimwear. Instead, the court issued an 
injunction requiring that VS use the disclaimer it was 
already using ("The Miracle Bra) swimwear collection is 
exclusive to Victoria's Secret and not associated with 
MIRACLESUIT(R) by SWIM SHAPER(R) ") when it uses THE 
MIRACLE BRA trademark with respect to swimwear. 
 
The court explained that A&H had not proven any direct 
diversion of sales but only a possibility of harm to 
reputation and goodwill, 967 F. Supp. at 1470, that there 
was no persuasive evidence that THE MIRACLE BRA bikini 
is of inferior quality to the MIRACLESUIT, and that an 
injunction prohibiting VS from using a "miracle" mark for 
swimwear would "do little to alleviate any existing confusion 
and resulting damage to reputation and goodwill which may 
have already occurred. However, relief in the form of a 
disclaimer is the more likely candidate for correcting any 
consumer misperceptions as to the source of the parties' 
products and repairing damage to Plaintiffs' reputation and 
goodwill." Id. at 1471. 
 
In the present posture of the case, we do not comment on 
the propriety of injunctive relief, as that will depend on 
what finding of harm, if any, the District Court makes on 
remand. We understand VS to have committed itself to 
continue using the disclaimer, whatever the eventual result 
in this case. We recognize the difficulty of evaluating the 
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effectiveness of a disclaimer, but note that this remedy has 
been applied in other cases, see Springs Mills, Inc. v. 
Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 724 F.2d 352 (2nd Cir. 1983) 
(no error in District Court's limited injunction mandating a 
disclaimer); see also AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 
341 (9th Cir. 1979) (use of contested mark must be 
accompanied by distinctive house mark or logo), and that 
the District Court fully articulated why it was an 
appropriate remedy in this case. 
 
We do comment on the portion of the District Court's 
order directing VS to pay royalties to A&H. The court 
directed that VS pay a 4% royalty on all net sales of THE 
MIRACLE BRA swimwear made prior to the date VS first 
used the disclaimer, a 2% royalty on sales made after the 
disclaimer, and a 2% royalty on all net future sales. See 
967 F. Supp. at 1482-83. It thus entered judgment against 
VS Stores in the amount of $63,480 and against VS 
Catalogue in the amount of $1,086,640.5  VS contends that 
a royalty award is generally reserved for patent cases, see 
35 U.S.C. S 284 (providing royalty in patent law), and that 
the award here was particularly inappropriate in light of the 
District Court's finding that VS did not act in bad faith. 
 
The objections to the royalty award are well taken. A 
royalty is a measure of damages for past infringement, 
often used in patent cases and in the context of trade 
secrets, but its use in trademark has been atypical. Neither 
party has proffered, nor have we found, any case in which 
a court both ordered a royalty award and continued to 
permit the infringer to use a disputed trademark, which is 
the effect of the District Court's order here. The court's 
award of a royalty for future sales put the court in the 
position of imposing a license neither party had requested 
or negotiated. 
 
Even when the courts have awarded a royalty for past 
trademark infringement, it was most often for continued 
use of a product beyond authorization, and damages were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. These figures were based on application of the 4% royalty to the net 
sales of the MIRACLE BRA swimwear up to the trial on damages. See 
967 F. Supp. at 1462, 1477, 1481. Shortly thereafter, VS began to use 
the disclaimer. Neither party challenges the calculations.) 
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measured by the license the parties had or contemplated. 
See, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 
1519-20 (11th Cir. 1990); Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsden 
Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562, 1563-65 (11th Cir. 1986); Boston 
Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 
F.2d 71, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1979) (royalty awarded based on 
license fee that defendant offered to pay but which plaintiff 
rejected). But see Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats 
Co. (Sands I), 978 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1992); Sands, Taylor 
& Wood v. Quaker Oats Co. (Sands II), 34 F.3d 1340 (7th 
Cir. 1994). There is no basis for inferring such an 
agreement here. Because A&H has suggested no other 
justification for the royalty on past sales, we need not 
speculate whether circumstances other than bad faith or a 
prior licensing agreement would authorize such an award. 
 
We would have similar concern about an award of 
damages based on any other theory. The cases awarding 
damages after a finding of likelihood of confusion have 
measured damages based on proof of lost sales. See, e.g., 
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 525-26 
(10th Cir. 1987); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition, S 36, cmt. c (absent proof of "actual harm" 
injunction adequate remedy). In fact, therefore, damages in 
those cases were measured based on actual confusion even 
though liability may have been sustained under a lesser 
burden. In light of the District Court's reiteration in the 
opinion on damages that "Plaintiffs failed to offer any 
evidence of lost profits or other pecuniary harm proximately 
caused by Defendants' use of THE MIRACLE BRA on 
swimwear," 967 F. Supp. at 1465, and its earlier finding 
that sales of the MIRACLESUIT have steadily increased 
since the introduction of the MIRACLE BRA swimwear, id., 
we see no basis to award damages or impose a royalty on 
past or future sales. 
 
Should A&H be successful on remand, it will 
undoubtedly argue that it is entitled to an accounting of 
profits. As we cannot anticipate what the District Court will 
find, we note only that "an accounting for profits is a form 
of equitable relief, and it does not follow as a matter of 
course upon the mere showing of an infringement. It will be 
denied where an injunction satisfies the equities of a case, 
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as for example, where there is a clear showing that no 
profit was made." Williamson-Dickie Mfg. v. Davis Mfg., 251 
F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1958) (footnote omitted). 
 
Finally, we recognize that, depending on its ultimate 
finding, the District Court may be asked again to order 
corrective advertising. It previously denied that request in 
light of its order of a disclaimer, its finding that VS did not 
act in bad faith,6 and its finding that A&H did not prove 
any sizeable damage. See 967 F. Supp. at 1478 79; see also 
Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 
F. Supp. 1219, 1233 (D. Colo. 1976) (awarding corrective 
advertising where defendant's conduct was "wanton and 
reckless"), aff'd as modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 
1977). However, we believe that any further comment on 
remedies, other than our rejection of a royalty under these 
facts, would be premature. 
 
IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize, we have held that a plaintiff seeking to 
show trademark infringement under the Lanham Act must 
prove that there is a likelihood of confusion between the 
marks at issue. We have not attempted to define "likelihood 
of confusion," leaving that to case-by-case development. 
Because the District Court did not use that standard in 
holding VS liable for trademark infringement, we must 
remand. In doing so, we do not require that the court hold 
a new evidentiary hearing. The court previously held a two- 
week non-jury trial to determine issues of liability, and a 
subsequent hearing on damages. We assume that the 
extensive record, including the transcripts and the exhibits 
from those trials, is still available to the court and the 
parties. The court has shown full comprehension of the 
facts, and it may be that the court can make the relevant 
findings from the material already available. For example, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Based on its finding that VS did not act in bad faith, the District 
Court rejected A&H's claim under the Pennsylvania Antidilution law, 54 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1124. 926 F. Supp. at 1265. 
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we have remanded on the assumption that the court did 
not make a finding on likelihood of confusion between THE 
MIRACLE BRA used on swimwear and MIRACLESUIT. If the 
District Court believes that such a finding can be made 
based on the record before it, it is free to do so. The District 
Court is free, however, to supplement the record as it 
deems appropriate. 
 
For the reasons set forth, we will remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party to pay 
its own costs. 
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APPENDIX 
 
First Circuit: 
 
       IAM v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 
       (lst Cir. 1996) ("To demonstrate likelihood of confusion 
       a markholder . . . must show more than the theoretical 
       possibility of confusion.") (citing American Steel 
       Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 382 (1926)); Star 
       Fin. Serv., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 
       10 (lst Cir. 1996) ("We require evidence of a 
       `substantial,' likelihood of confusion -not a mere 
       possibility"); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove 
       Works, 626 F.2d 193, 194 (lst Cir.1980) ("A mere 
       possibility, however, is not enough, there must be a 
       substantial likelihood that the public will be confused 
       as to the source of the goods.")(citing HMH Publ'g Co. 
       v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1974)); Valmor 
       Prods. Co. v. Standard Prod. Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 202, 
       203 (lst Cir. 1972); T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 
       449 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 587 F.2d 533 (lst 
       Cir. 1978). 
 
Second Circuit: 
 
       Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 
       1511 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The test, however, is not whether 
       confusion is possible; nor is it whether confusion is 
       probable among customers who are not knowledgeable. 
       Rather, the test . . . is whether confusion is probable 
       among numerous customers who are ordinarily 
       prudent."); Totalplan Corp. of America v. Colborne, 14 
       F.3d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1994) ("For a finding of 
       infringement a probability of confusion, not a mere 
       possibility, must be found to exist.") (quoting Gruner + 
       Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 
       1077 (2d Cir. 1993)); Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. K-Mart Corp., 
       849 F. Supp. 252,272 (S.D.N.Y.) ("However, a court can 
       only find a Lanham Act violation if there is a likelihood 
       of confusion, not merely the possibility of confusion."), 
       vacated by consent, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863 (S.D.N.Y. 
       1994). 
 
Fourth Circuit: 
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       AMP Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (4th Cir.1976) 
       ("[T]he test is `likelihood to confuse.' Mere possibility of 
       confusion is not sufficient."); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar 
       Corp. of America, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 997, 1007 (D.S.C. 
       1995) ("As the term likelihood of confusion, suggests, 
       while it is not necessary for a trademark owner to 
       prove that the defendant's use of a colorable imitation 
       of its trademark has or will create actual confusion, it 
       is not sufficient for the trademark owner to show a 
       mere `possibility of confusion', or mere resemblance of 
       the marks."), aff'd, 110 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1997); 
       Dominion Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Ridge Dev. Corp., 
       231 U.S.P.Q. 976 (E.D. Va.1986); N. Hess & Sons, Inc. 
       v. Hess Apparel, Inc., 216 U.S.P.Q. 721, 734 (D. Md. 
       1982), aff'd, 738 F.2d 1412 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Although 
       the plaintiff is not required to produce proof of actual 
       confusion, a mere possibility of confusion is not 
       sufficient."); accord Selchow & Righter Co. v. Decilpher, 
       Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1496- 97 (E.D. Va. 1984); 
       Lacoste Alligator, S.A. v. Bluestein's Men's Wear, 569 F. 
       Supp. 491, 497 (D.S.C. 1983); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. 
       Temple, 566 F. Supp. 385, 394 (D.S.C. 1983), aff'd, 
       747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: 
 
       Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 
       (5th Cir. 1998) ("The touchstone of infringement is 
       whether the use creates a likelihood of confusion . . . 
       [which] is synonymous with a probability of confusion, 
       which is more than a mere possibility of confusion."); 
       Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th 
       Cir. 1998) ("Liability for trademark infringement hinges 
       upon whether a likelihood of confusion exists between 
       the marks at issue. Likelihood of confusion is 
       synonymous with a probability of confusion, which is 
       more than a mere possibility of confusion.") (citation 
       omitted); Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 
       597 F.2d 496, 501 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[Plaintiff] would 
       concede that when the alleged infringer is a newcomer, 
       the test for trademark infringement is not whether 
       there is a likelihood of confusion, but whether there is 
       any possibility of confusion. This Circuit has not 
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       adopted that position, and we see no reason to add 
       such a gloss to the language of 15 U.S.C.A. S 1114."); 
       Fram Corp. v. W.E. Boyd, 230 F.2d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 
       1956) ("[T]he existence of a mere possibility of 
       deception does not in and of itself constitute a basis on 
       which to sustain a charge of unfair competition."). 
 
Seventh Circuit: 
 
       August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 619 
       (7th Cir. 1995) ("Once again, the district judge 
       apparently believed that a `possibility' of confusion 
       justifies a restriction on competition, which it does 
       not."); S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc., 12 F. 
       Supp. 2d 796, 813 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("[T]he plaintiff must 
       demonstrate a likelihood, not the mere possibility, of 
       confusion."); MJ & Partners Restaurant, L.P. v. Zadikoff, 
       10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 926-27 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("[P]laintiff 
       must prove a `likelihood' of confusion, not a mere 
       `possibility' of confusion."); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally 
       Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
       (same); Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. , 551 F. 
       Supp. 1060, 1064-65 (N.D. Ill.1982) ("There must be a 
       likelihood, and not a mere possibility, of confusion.") 
       (quoting Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 
       509 F. Supp. 323, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1981)). 
 
Eighth Circuit: 
 
       Children's Factory, Inc. v. Benee's Toys, Inc. , 160 F.3d 
       489, 494 (8th Cir. 1998) ("In order to find a likelihood 
       of confusion, this court has stated that `there must be 
       a substantial likelihood that the public will be 
       confused.' Actual confusion is not essential to afinding 
       of infringement. The mere possibility of confusion, 
       however, is not enough.") (citations omitted); Vitek Sys., 
       Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1982) 
       ("However, a mere possibility is not enough; there must 
       be a substantial likelihood that the public will be 
       confused.") (quoting Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter 
       Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193,194 (lst Cir. 1980)); 
       U.S. Jaycees v. Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. 
       Supp. 1360, 1363 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Omaha Nat'l Bank 
       v. Citibank, N.A., 633 F. Supp. 231, 234 (D. Neb. 
       1986). 
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Ninth Circuit: 
 
       Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 
       1215,1217 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Likelihood of confusion 
       requires that confusion be probable, not simply a 
       possibility."); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 
       809 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1987) ("While the 
       possibility of confusion almost always exists, the test is 
       likelihood of confusion."); HMH Publ'g Co. v. Brincat, 
       504 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1974) ("We commence by 
       emphasizing that the mere possibility that the public 
       will be confused with respect to HMH's sponsorship of 
       appellant's products is not enough. There must exist a 
       likelihood that such confusion will result."); HMH 
       Publ'g Co. v. Lambert, 482 F.2d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 
       1973) ("The test is not that there might be a`possibility 
       of confusion as to the source of plaintiffs' and 
       defendants' business, but rather whether there is a 
       likelihood of confusion."); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter 
       & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 1970) ("The 
       most this court could say is that there might be a 
       possibility of confusion ... there is certainly no 
       likelihood of such confusion."). 
 
Tenth Circuit: 
 
       Buca, Inc. v. Gambucci's, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 
       1211 (D. Kan. 1998) ("Establishing `a potential' for 
       confusion is insufficient; plaintiff must demonstrate `a 
       likelihood' of confusion."); United States Surgical Corp. 
       v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1209 (D. Kan 1998) 
       (plaintiff "must show a probability, not just a 
       possibility, of confusion"). Federal Circuit: Bongrain 
       Int'l (American) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 
       1479, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The statute refers to 
       likelihood, not the mere possibility, of confusion."). 
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